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424 MALMGREN v. MOCOLGAN [20 C. (2d) 
[So F. No. 16365. In Bank. June 9, 1942.] 
; 
HARRIET C. MALMGREN, Respondent, V. CHARLES J. 
MoCOLGAN, as Franchise Tax Commissioner, etc., 
Appellant. 
DAISY F. CASWELL, Respondent, V. CHARLES J. 
MoCOLGAN, as Franchlse Tax Commissioner, etc.; 
Appellant. 
[1] Taxation-Income Taxes-Esta.te Income.-As a general rule, 
the net income of an estate is taxable to beneficiaries only if 
it is distributed or distributable to them in the taxable year 
received by the estate. 
[2] Id.-Income Taxes-Estate Income-Taxation to Legatees.-
Under the Personal Income Tax Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1090, 
Stats. 1937, p. 1844, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 8494), 
§ 12 (d) (3) makes four specifications governing deductibility 
of income by the estate and its taxability to the legatees: 
(1) The income must be received during the administration 
of the estate; (2) it must be income of the estate for its tax-
able year; (3) it must be paid or credited to the legatees 
properly, and (4) during that taxable year. 
[3a, 3b] Id.-Income Taxes-Estate Income-Taxation to Legatees. 
-Under the Personal Income Tax Act, § 12 (d) (3), income of 
an estate is taxable to the legatees where the estate is on a 
calendar year basis, where the income is received during 
administration and settlement of the estate, and is income of 
the estate for its taxable year, where the distribution of the 
estate is made during such year and at the same time as the 
allowance of the final account and discharge of the executor. 
The statute refers to all income received during administra-
tion and properly paid during the taxable year of the estate. 
Even if the administration is assumed to terminate before the 
final distribution, the estate's taxable year runs until the end 
of the twelve months' accounting period. 
'[4] ld. - Income Taxes - Taxable Year. - Under the Personal 
Income Tax Act, the taxable year represents an accounting 
period of twelve months. It is not reduced to a shorter period 
by the circumstance that a taxpayer undergoes a change, in 
[3J See 27 Am. Jur. 357. 
!lcK. Dig. Reference: [1-7] Taxation, § 458. 
,~ 
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status or ceases to exist, or that the income reported is for 
less than a twelve months' p~riod. 
ld.-Income TaxeS-:Estate Income-Distribution with Corpus., 
-Income of an estate retains its character as such whether 
it is distributed separately from or with the corpUs of the 
estate: ' 
Id.-Income Taxes-Estate Income-TaxatioD to Legatees.-
Notwithstanding Personal Income Tax Act, § 7 (b) (3) declar-
ing to be exempt the value of 'property acquired by gift, 
bequest, devise, or inheritance, a legatee who inherits the'right; 
to receive income may be taxed on the incoine. ' The estate' 
bears the burden of the tax when it' holds the income, and; 
transfers that burden to the legatee when it distributes the. 
income. 
[7] ld.-Income Taxes-Estate Income-Taxation to Legatees.-, 
To authorize, the taxation of a legatee on income, it is not 
necessary that he be entitled to have it paid to him at the' 
time the estate receives it. While under Personal Income Tax 
Act, § 12 (d) (2)" currently distributable income is taxable to 
the beneficiary, it does not follow that only such income is 
taxable to him. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. I. M. Golden, Judge. 
Reversed. 
Two actions for refund of income taxes paid under protest. 
Judgments for plaintiffs on the pleadings reversed. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, H. H. Linney, James J. 
Arditto, and Valentine Brookes, Thlputies Attorney General, 
for Appellant. . 
Joseph C. Meyerstein for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-George W. Caswell,. a resident of San. 
Francisco, died testate on August 22, 1935. His will directed 
the payrilent of certain specific bequests, confirmed the Ijght 
of his wife to one half of the community property and left 
the balance of the estate to his daughter, Harriet C. Malm-
gren. Under the decree of final distribution, entered by the . 
court on November 3,1937, the payment of debts and charges, 
family allowance and legacies, was approved and the residue 
was distributed, one half to testator's daughter and one half 
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to his wife. The executrix made a return pursuant. to the 
California Personal Income Tax Act (Stats. 1935,p. 1090; 
amended by Stats. 1937, p. 1831; Stats. 1939, p. 2528; Stats. 
194i, pp. 471, 2121, 3220; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8494) on 
behalf of the estate for. each year of its administration. In 
1937 she paid from the income account, estate and inheritance 
taxes, which are non-deductible under section 8 (c) of the act. 
She made a return setting forth all income received by 
the estate in 1937 and paid the tax computed on the full 
amount thereof withont. deduction. The commissioner re-
turned the tax to the executrix and assessed a tax to testator's 
wife on one half the income and to testator's daughter on the 
other half. The taxes so assessed were paid under protest. 
The trial court overruled appellant's demurrers and granted 
respondent's motions for judgments on the pleadings. From: 
these judgments this appeal was taken pursuant to a stipu-
lationfor consolidation. 
[1]· Respondents concede that the account from which the 
estate made the distribution does not establish its character 
as a payment of corpus or income. (Burnet v. Whitehouse, 
283 U. S. 148 [51 S. Ct. 374, 75 L. Ed. 916]; Helvering v. 
Butterworthl 290 U.S. 365 [54 S. Ct. 221, 78 L.Ed. 365] ; 
Letts v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 84 F. (2d) 760, 762;, 
Sitterding v. CommisMoner of Ht; Rev., 80 F. (2d) 939.) It 
is clear also that the failure of the estate to deduct the income 
as a distribution· to ~egatees does not free the legatees of tax 
thereon, if thedistrijJHtion is a proper payment of income, 
to them. (Riker v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 42 F. (2d) 
150; Little v. White, 47 F. (2d) 512;) Each year the net 
income of an estate becomes subject toa tax against either 
the estate or the beneficiaries. As a general rule it is taxable 
to the beneficiaries only if it is distributed or distributable 
to them in the taxabl,e year received by the estat.e.. Thecom-
missioner cannot, and did not attempt to tax to respondents 
incom~ received by and taxed to the estate in a year prior 
to 1937. (Oommissionerof Int. Rev. v. Owens, 78 F. (2d) 
768; Haag, 19 B.T. A. 982; Ball, 27 B. T. A. 388.) Thesole 
question on these appeals! therefore, is whether tinder the 
California Personal Income Tax Act as amended in 1937, the 
income admittedly received, by the estate in 193,7 is taxable 
to the estate or to the wife and daughter. 
Everything· in the estate was distributed, including' the 
1937 income. The commissioner .contends that this income 
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is taxable to the wife and daughter un.der paragr~ph (3) o~ 
section 12 (d) of the act providing:" In the case ()f inco1ll6 
received by estates of deceased personsdurlng the period p£ 
administration or settlement of the estate, and in the cMe o~ 
income which, in the discretion. of, the fiduciary, may', be 
either distributed' to the beneficiary or accumulated, ther~ 
shall. be allowlld as an additional deduction in computing the 
net income. of '. the estate or trust the amount of the. inqonie 
of the estate or trust for its taxable year,~hich is properly 
paid or ,credited during such year to any' legatee, heir, or, 
beneficiary, but the. amount so allowed as a deduction shall 
be included in computing the net income of the legatee, heir 
or beneficiary." . .,' 
[2] The foregoing provision makes four speclfications 
governing deductibility of the income by the estate and its 
taxability to the legatees: (1) The income must be received, 
during the administration of the estate; (2) it must be income 
of the estate for its taxable year ;(3). it mu.st be paid' or 
credited to the legatees properly, and (4) du.ring that taxable 
year. 
[3a] The income in question meets these. specifications. 
.;. (1) It was received by the estate in 1937 during the adminis-
tration and settlement of the estate. (2) The estate was on 
. a calendar year basis and the income it receivedbetweeIl 
January 1, 1937 and December 31, 1937, was income' of the 
estate for that taxable year. (3) The approval of the probate, 
court leaves. no question that. the distribution was properly 
made. (Freuler v. Helvering; 291 U. S. 35 [54 S.Ot. 308, 
78L. Ed. 634].) (4) Respondent concedes that th~.1ast tax~ 
able year of the estate' was ihe entire calendar. year 1937. 
The distribution of November 3, 1937, was theref()re made 
during that taxable year even tb.ou.gh. the final account wa~ 
allowed and the executrix or,dered discharged at . the. same 
time. [4] The taxable year represents Itnaccounting"perlod 
of twelve months. It is not reduced to a shorter period,by 
the circumstance that' a taxpayer undergoes a· chan.ge 'm 
status or ceases to exist or that the income reported isfot 
less than a twelve .months' period. (Bankers Trustao. v. 
Bowers, 295 F. 89 [31 A. L. R. 922]; Strong I1ewai& ao.V:. 
U. S., 62 Ct. Cls. 67; Louis Hymel Planting &- Mig·. po:, 5 
B. T. A. 910; Penn et al. Ex~cutors v. Robertson, 115 F.(2d) 
167; Helvering v. Morgan~s Inc., 293, U.s' 121 (5'5 S. ,O't; 60', 
79 L. Ed. 232]; Palomai 'tand &; Oattle '00. v. Oommissioner 
428 MALMGREN V. MCCOLGAN [20 C. (2d) 
of Int. Rev., 91 F. (2d) 100; Oommissioner of Int. Rev. v. 
General Machinery Corp., 95 F. (2d) 759.) [3b]. In S. F. 
Durkheimer, 41 B. T. A.585, on which respondents rely, the 
board of tax appeals held the iJ{come taxable to the estate 
and not to the residuary legatee on the theory that the final 
distribution was not made before the completion of the admin-
istration of the estate. The board interpreted subdivision (c) 
of section 162 of the federal act, which corresponds to para-
graph (3) of section 12 (d) of the state act, as having refer-
ence "only to· cases where the income has been paid or prop-
erly credited to the legatee during the period of administra-
tion or settlement." This interpretation is erroneous. The 
statute refers to all income received during administration 
and properly paid during the taxable year of. the estate. 
Even if the administration were assumed to terminate before 
the final distribution, the estate's taxable year runs until the 
end of the twelve months' accounting period. Income prop-
erly paid during that period that was received during the 
administration of the estate is deductible by the estate and 
taxable to the legatee under the plain language of the statute. 
[5] There remains the question whether the income 
retained its character as income when it was distributed to 
the legatees as part of the total assets. Income of an estate 
is clearly income to the legatees when distributed separately 
from the corpus of the estate. When it is distributed along 
with the corpus nothing occurs to alter its character. In 
either case it is merely transferred, not transformed. Before 
its distribution it is identified as income even though it is 
allied with the corpus as a constituent of the entire estate. 
it does not lose its identity after distribution to the legatees 
for whose benefit it has been held when it is allied with the 
corpus in distribution. The right of a legatee to the corpus 
vests at the death of the testator and" residuary legatees who 
receive payments of funds composed both of original assets 
of the estate and of estate income, receive that portion repre-
sented by estate income as income derived from their own 
property." (Weigel v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 96 F. 
(2d) 387, 389.) In Weber v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 111 
F. (2d) 766, profit from the sale of a farm devised to residu-
ary legatees, with a power of sale conferred on the executors, 
was distributed to them as part of the proceeds, and was held 
properly paid to them and deductible by the estate under 
section 162 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1932, corresponding 
,. 
1 
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with paragraph (3) of section 12 (d) of the state act. The 
court declared: ' , We cannot grasp the commissioner's argu-
ment that the profit on the sale 'was never payable to them 
as such but was paid to them in discharge of their lega,cies.' 
The profit was payable to them as profit, because it Was part 
of· the proceeds of sale of the farm. See. Commissioner of 
Int. Rev. v. Stearns, 2 Cir. 65 F. (2d) 371. On the assump;, 
tion that it was the estate which realized tlieprofit the ,case 
is squarely within section 162 (c)." (See contra, Estate of 
Anderson v. Oommissioner of Int. Rev., 126 F. (2d) 46,; 
cf. Oounty NationalBank &7 Trust 00. v. Helvering, 122 P. 
(2d) 29.) 
[6] Respondents contend, however, that the. entire distri-
bution constitutes a legacy no part of which can be regarded 
as income, and is therefore exempt under section 7; (b) (3) of 
the act providing: "The following items shall not be included 
in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under 
this act: ... (3) The value of property acquired by gift, 
bequest, devise, or inheritance (but the income from such 
property shall be included in gross income)." 
This contention is answered by the decision in Irwin v •. 
Gavit, 268 U. S. 161 [45 S. Ct. 475, 69 L. Ed. 897], interpret-
ing an identical provision in the Federal Income Tax Act of 
1913 exempting bequests but taxing the income therefrom. 
A legatee who inherited the right to receive the income of a 
trust for fifteen years was held taxable on that income. The 
contention that the inherited income was his bequest yielded 
to the holding that all income of the estate arising after the 
death of the testator was taxable to someone and that Congress 
made ittaxable to the recipient. In imposing the tax upon 
the beneficiary the income tax statutes of both the state and 
federal government thus distinguish between the estate and 
its income irrespective of whether the beneficiary may receive 
the income as a legacy. Under paragraph (3) of section.12 (d) 
of the state act, as in the corresponding federal provisions, 
the burden of taxation accompanies the income. The estate 
bears the burden of the tax when it holds the income, and 
transfers that burden to the legatee when it distributes the 
income. 
[7] Respondents have advanced the theory that a legatee 
is not taxable on income' received by an estate unless he is 
entitled to have ~t paid to him at the time the estate receives it~ 
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No such lImitation, however, can be found in either thefed~ 
eral o.rsta:te acts,no.r couldit be read into. these acts witho.ut 
nullifying paragraph (3) of sect ibn 12 (d) of the state act 
;ail well as section 162 (c) o.f the Internal Revenue Code. 
Actually paragraph (3) of section 12 (d) supplements the 
,provision in paragraph (2) of that section that currently 
distributable income is taxable to. the beneficiary. All income 
to which the beneficiary is entitled at the time of its receipt 
'by the fiduciary falls into the. categor;r of income to. be dis-
tributed currently, envisaged in paragraph (2). It does not 
;follow, however, that only such income is taxable to the 
beneficiary. The taxability of income to the beneficiary is 
not precluded by paragraph (2) simply because the income 
does not fall within Its scope. Paragraph (3) designates 
income as taxable to the beneficiary precisely because it does 
not fall within the scope of paragraph (2). Under paragraph 
(3) income that is distributable in the discretion of the fidu-
ciary is deductible when distributed to the beneficiary and 
taxable to the latter even though he is not entitled to such 
income at the time of its receipt by the fiduciary. Similarly, 
the provision in paragraph (3) that income received by an 
estate and paid to a legatee is deductible by the estate and 
taxable to the legatee makes it clear that such income is not 
iimited to that contemplated by paragraph (2). 
Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148 [51 S. Ct. 374, 75 L 
Ed. 916], Roebling v. Oommissioner of Int. Rev., 78 F. (2d) 
444, and Spreckels v. Oommissioner of Int. Rev., 101 F. (2d) 
721, on which respondents rely, are concerned with the mean-
ing of currently distributable income in the federal income 
tax provisions corresponding to paragraph (2) of section 
12 (d). They are not concerned with the pro.visions corre-
sponding to paragraph (3) of that section encompassing the 
income of estates jn administration and income that can be 
distributed at the discretion of the trustee. In any event the 
1937 amendment to paragraph (2) of section 12 (d) renders 
the foregoing cases inapplicable even to that paragraph by 
providing, " ... For the purpose of this paragraph amounts 
currently distributable to beneficiaries are distributable out 
of income of the estate or trust' for the taxable year if there 
is inco.me of the estate or trust for the taxable year out o.f 
which such distributions may be m~e and if, under the terms 
of the will or trust instrument, the distributions may be made 
out of such income,' regardless of the fact that the will Or 
, 
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trust instrument provides that the distributions mayberitade 
out of the Co.rpus o.f the estate or trust •.• " (Stats. 1937, 
p.1844.)· 
The judgments are reversed. 
Gibso.n, C. J." Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmo.nds, J., 'and 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was"denied July 6~ 
1942. 
[L. A. No. 18117. In Bank. June 9, 1942.] 
FRAIN R. ANDERSON, Respondent, v. MARY M. ANDER-
SON, Appellant. . 
[1] Appeal- Record - Time for Filing - Effect of DelaY. - An 
appeal will be dismissed for failure to. file a transcript in time 
where a bill of exceptions was settled and the engrossed bill 
signed without a hearing having heen set,· notice given or 
hearing held to settle the bill,and where appellant, although 
served with a copy of the engrossed hili, took no steps to have 1t 
corrected or to prevent the trial judge from signing it,or to 
set aside the order of settlement, and where the time for filing 
the transcript had elapsed. 
[2] Id.-Record-Time for Filing-Effect of Delay.--"':Ari 'appeal 
will not he dismissed on the ground that a transcript was not 
filed in time where the engrossed hill of exceptions was not 
signed by the trial judge, and the time for filing th~ tran-' 
script had not as a consequence hegun to run. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court o.f Los 
Angeles County for partition and from an order confirming 
sale of property. ThomasC; Gould, Judge. Appeal fromjudg-
ment dismissed .on motion; motion to dismiss. appeal from order 
denied. 
. [2] .See2Cal. Jur .. ,653. :. ..' d, >" ; I;'; ).; '':';]"; 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Appeal and Error, § 732. 
